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Abstract: 
Eurojust is the new judiciary co-operation unit of the European Union. This article analyses the 
decision-making  process  behind  its  creation,  explained  in  terms  of  ‘institutional  games’.  The 
establishment of Eurojust illustrates the specificities of European institutional configurations and 
the interactions occurring in Brussels among officials, judges and ministers. Moreover, it elucidates 
the important role of the leadership of the General Secretariat of the Council, and the socialisation 
and specialisation of a group with a high level of intellectual resources, willing to participate to the 
‘noble’ task of institutional innovation. This article defines the determining factors of intense inter-
institutional  competition,  where  the  Commission  and  OLAF  adhere  to  autonomous  and 
parliamentary principles. Furthermore, it takes into account the specific work undertaken by the 
Presidency (or Presidencies), as well as the decisive role of the  Intergovernmental Conference, 
which, through the means of a high level of decision-making, enables specific moves to be made in 
the games. 
 
Keywords:  magistrate,  European  construction,  political  institutions  and  agencies,  bureaucracy, 
organisational theory. 
 
Résumé : 
Eurojust est le nouvel organe de coopération judiciaire en matière pénale de l’Union européenne. 
Cet article consiste en une sociologie de la décision de sa création, analysée en termes de « jeux 
institutionnels ». La genèse d’Eurojust est illustrative de certaines spécificités des configurations 
institutionnelles  européennes  et  interactions  bruxelloises  entre  fonctionnaires,  magistrats  et 
ministres. Elle donne à voir le leadership du Secrétariat général du Conseil, la socialisation et la 
spécialisation d’un groupe aux ressources intellectuelles élevées et intéressé au travail « noble » 
d’innovation institutionnelle. Cet article revient sur les effets déterminants d’une forte concurrence 
inter-institutionnelle  avec  la  Commission  et  l’OLAF  pris  dans  une  logique  autonome 
et  parlementaire, sur le travail spécifique de la présidence ou des présidences et, enfin, sur le rôle 
décisif de la conjoncture de Conférence intergouvernementale qui, élevant le niveau de la décision, 
seule, permet certains coups. 
 
Mots-clés : juge, construction européenne, institutions politiques et agences, bureaucratie, théorie 
des organisations.  
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Introduction 
 
Eurojust is the new EU body for judicial co-
operation  in  penal  matters.  Born  out  of  a 
Council  decision  on  28  February  2002  and 
located in The Hague since December 2002, it 
has  legal  personality.  Its  objective  is  to 
improve  co-ordination  between  national 
lawyers and investigators working on serious 
inter-state criminal investigations by offering 
assistance  in  order  to  strengthen  the 
effectiveness  of  the  work.  This  article  will 
analyse the conditions and the rationale of the 
development  and  intervention  of  Eurojust 
within  the  European  criminal  judicial  area. 
The creation of Eurojust is the latest stage in 
the  process  of  institutional  judicial  co-
operation within the framework of the EU’s 
third  pillar  –  defined  after  the  coming  into 
force  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  (TEU)  in 
November  1993.  The  stages  are  as  follows: 
the introduction of Liaison Magistrates;
1 the 
creation  of  the  European  Judicial  Network 
(1998);
2  and  finally,  Eurojust.  This  project 
seems to be currently (and for several years to 
come)  the  most  ‘integrated’  for  judicial  co-
operation in penal matters. In addition to the 
Nice Treaty (February 2001), it is mentioned 
in  the  project  of  the  constitutional  treaty 
signed on 29 October 2004 in Rome (Article 
III-273).  
  Unlike  the  project  of  the  European 
Public Prosecutor, for example, the Eurojust 
project  has  been  successfully  completed. 
Many have claimed to be responsible for its 
                                                 
1 Common Action, 22 April 1996 (OJ, 27 April 1996). 
2 Common Action, 29 April 1998 (OJ, 7 July 1998). 
success – in France, Germany and Belgium. 
These multiple claims can be explained by the 
fact  that  Eurojust  was  nothing  more  than  a 
name or a label for quite some time. Although 
the  name  was  actually  invented  during  the 
preparation of the Tampere European Council 
in  1999,  the  idea  stems  from  both  Helmut 
Kohl’s  suggestion  for  a  ‘European  FBI’  in 
1991,  and  the  creation  of  Europol  in  the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992). This period saw the 
birth of the idea of  a European agency that 
would  be  the  equivalent  of  Europol  in  the 
judicial field. To use a term from one of our 
interviewees, Eurojust has been ‘written in the 
stars since Europol’.
3 The day following the 
coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty, 2 
November  1993,  a  first  initiative  was 
mentioned  as  ‘the  origin’  of  Eurojust.  The 
Belgian  Minister  of  Justice  proposed  a 
common  action  establishing  a  ‘Centre  for 
Information, Discussion and Exchange in the 
field  of  Judicial  Co-operation’  (CIREJUD). 
The  model  was  provided  by  the  existing 
structures  in  the  fields  of  Asylum  (CIREA) 
and  Immigration  (CIREFI).  However,  this 
proposal  only  concluded  in  1998  with  a 
network  of  contact  points  called  the 
‘European Judicial Network’ (EJN). 
                                                 
3 Former Swedish judge Hans Nilsson, then working in 
the  Council  of  Europe’s  (Strasbourg)  division  of 
criminal issues and the management of Legal Affairs, 
recalled a discussion he had in 1991 on a train ride with 
Wolfgang  Schomburg,  former  lawyer  and  then 
Undersecretary  of  State  at  the  Senate  Justice 
Department  in  the  Land  of  Berlin  (interview,  July 
2003).  
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  Without  re-telling  the  ‘heroic’  story 
told  by  many  of  our  interviewees,
4  instead 
explaining  as  precisely  as  possible  this 
sociology  of  decision-making,  we  have 
chosen  a  present  this  analysis  in  terms  of 
‘institutional  games’.  These  games  are 
relatively autonomous and connected – in the 
sense  that  the  actors  and  the  spaces  where 
they develop are differentiated and they have 
they  own  rules  and  issues.  Within  these 
games, a single move inevitably has an effect 
on  the  way  that  other  moves  are  made; 
whereas some moves that might work in one 
particular  game  do  not  always  work  in 
another. In essence, Eurojust is a product of 
the  interaction  and  the  unification  of  the 
moves within these games. Although some of 
these  (five)  games  took  place  at  different 
times, a few of them played out in the same 
decisive sequence, from July to December of 
2000. 
  The first of these games is organised 
around  the  ‘organisational  leadership’  (as 
Selznick  calls  it  in  Selznick,  1957),  of  the 
General  Secretariat  of  the  Council  (GSC), 
which  is  a  inconspicuous  Community  body, 
and  the  socialisation  and  specialisation  of  a 
group  with  a  high  standard  of  intellectual 
resources,  interested  in  the  ‘noble’  work  of 
institutional creation and ingenuity. The other 
games  are  determined  by  many  factors, 
including:  fierce  inter-institutional 
competition  with  the  Commission,  which 
subscribes to an autonomous and established 
governmental logic; or they are marked by the 
unique rhythm of the presidencies’ rotations; 
or determined by a specific context like the 
Intergovernmental  Conference  (IGC),  which 
enables certain moves to be made.   
  This  research  also  takes  on  the 
perspectives developed by Jamous, according 
to  whom  the  role  of  personalities  is  a  key 
                                                 
4  We  have  undertaken  a  dozen  interviews  with  the 
actors who were involved in the creation of Eurojust, 
selected through a ‘snowball’ effect. This study is part 
of  a  research  contract  completed  in  May  2004  with 
Hélène  Michel  and  Natacha  Paris  for  the  Mission 
Research  Law  and  Justice  (the  mobilisation  against 
organised  crime  and  the  institutionalisation  of  a 
European criminal judicial area, 1996-2001). 
factor in processes of change, especially due 
to  their  charismatic  power  (Jamous,  1969). 
Hence,  the  members  of  the  GSC  are 
mediators  or  marginal  actors  among 
administrative  (with  a  separation  between 
national  and  European  level  here),  judicial 
and  academic  fields.  They  surround 
themselves  or  form  an  alliance  with 
candidates;  for  example  justice  officials  or 
magistrates  who  hold  administrative 
functions.  Once  again,  in  reference  to 
Jamous’s  categories,  it  becomes  an  issue  of 
social  groups  and  professionals  espousing 
new  values  that  are  disharmonious  when 
compared to a traditional system (the judicial 
one  in  this  case).  These  new  values  are 
supposedly about Europeanisation and, more 
precisely,  the  invention  of  new  instruments 
brought into use after simple interpersonal co-
operation.  
  Therefore,  this  article  considers  an 
approach  where  individuals  often  play  a 
decisive  role  –  but  one  in  which  personal 
power  is  primarily  understood  through  the 
respective involvement and position in these 
institutional games. From this perspective, the 
power of actors in the General Secretariat and, 
to  a  certain  degree,  the  charisma  that  they 
possess is contingent upon their presence in 
the  institutional  games  –  with  one  notable 
exception:  the  IGC  (simply  because  of  its 
high  level  of  decision-making).  As  these 
actors  produce  the  formal  characteristics  of 
the  organisation,  they  contribute  to  form 
(around  themselves)  spaces  of  negotiations 
and  play  (Friedberg  1997:  160).  They  both 
determine ‘organisational behaviour’ and are 
stable actors in the processes of interactions 
and  of  negotiations  with  regard  to, 
respectively,  Allison’s  second  and  third 
models  of  the  sociology  of  decision-making 
(Allison 1971). 
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Agenda & Guidelines: the game of 
the General Secretariat of the 
Council 
 
The  first  game  provides  an  example  of  the 
entrepreneurial  role  played  by  the  General 
Secretariat of the Council
5 and its Directorate-
General,  Justice  and  Home  Affairs  (JHA). 
Since  1995,  the  Council  Secretariat  has  had 
its own Directorate-General, which is separate 
from the European Commission. At the end of 
1994,  the  new  Secretary-General  of  the 
Council  decided  to  expand  the  Directorate-
General  to  full  status  from  its  previous, 
smaller  role  under  the  JHA  Directorate 
(created in November 1993). While the first 
officer in charge was not a specialist (Deputy 
Permanent  Representative  of  Belgium  and 
former Chief Inspector of Finance), there was 
high-level  recruitment  and  a  high  degree  of 
judicial expertise. Charles Elsen, in charge of 
these  issues  for  the  Ministry  of  Justice  in 
Luxembourg for thirty years and founder of 
TREVI,
6 was named Director-General. Julian 
Schutte, with 20 years of similar experience 
in the Dutch Ministry of Justice and having 
co-authored  the  Schengen  Agreement,  was 
then  appointed  legal  director.  Working 
closely  with  ministers,  he  contributed  to 
forming the judicial policy of the Netherlands. 
The  most  emblematic  of  cases  was  that  of 
Gilles  de  Kerchove.  A  teaching  assistant  at 
the Catholic University of Louvain, Head of 
Cabinet  in  the  Belgian  Ministry  of  Justice 
since 1989 and, as such, associated with the 
1993 proposal of CIREJUD, Kerchove, who 
was in competition with a maître des requêtes 
of the French Council of State for the post, 
was  appointed  as  Director  of  police  and 
judicial co-operation in September 1995. The 
team was finally completed in July 1996 with 
                                                 
5  An  organisation  that  we  have  also  studied,  see 
Mangenot 2003. 
6  The  TREVI  network  (Terrorism,  Radicalism, 
Extremism,  International  Violence)  was  created  in 
Rome, 1 December 1975, and was the first European 
initiative  in  the  field  of  police  and  judicial  co-
operation,  although  it  was  strictly  intergovernmental 
and focused on combating terrorism. This co-operation 
was increased with TREVI II & III.   
the  appointment  of  Hans  Nilsson,  who  was 
judge  of  the  Swedish  Court  of  Appeal,  an 
expert on criminal law and had worked in the 
Council of Europe for ten years. He was hired 
as  head  of  the  ‘Judicial  Co-operation’ 
division.  The  perspective  is  fundamentally 
different from that of the Commission. Adrian 
Fortescue  –  a  British  diplomat  from  the 
London  School  of  Economics,  seconded  to 
the Commission since 1985, Head of Cabinet 
for Lord Cockfield and Commissioner for the 
Internal Market (1985-89) – was appointed as 
head of the JHA Task Force in the General 
Secretariat of the Commission in 1994, then 
as  the  first  Director-General  in  1999.
7  The 
new head of unit for ‘Judicial Co-operation’, 
Gisèle  Vernimmen,  came  from  DG  Internal 
Market.  These  two  senior  officials  do  not 
have a judicial background.
8 
  The events of autumn 1996 took place 
within  this  configuration.  The  Irish 
Presidency had chosen the fight against drugs 
as  its  primary  theme,  after  the  well-known 
journalist Veronica Guerin was murdered in 
Ireland by drug traffickers. Additionally, the 
White  March  in  Brussels  took  place,  with 
over  300,000  people  gathered  in  protest 
against  the  Dutroux  affair.  Hans  Nilsson 
recalls: ‘That caused an outcry in Ireland, and 
they decided to devote a part of the Dublin 
European Council – Dublin II – to combating 
organised  crime,  and  they  [the  Irish 
Presidency] had decided to call a meeting of 
the K4 Committee [a committee with a high 
level of co-ordination]’.
9 
  During this meeting, which took place 
on 15 October 1996, the General Secretariat’s 
team  seized  the  opportunity  of  ‘organised 
crime’ being placed on the agenda in order to 
– according to some comments in one of our 
                                                 
7 He was replaced on 15 March 2003 by another Briton 
from the cabinet of Leon Brittan, and became Deputy 
Director-General  of  Competition,  then  Director-
General of Press and Communication. 
8 The situation remained similar in 1999 when Denise 
Sorasio, an official in the Commission’s legal service 
and  Head  of  Cabinet  for  the  President  of  European 
Parliament,  was  appointed  director  of  Police  and 
Judicial Co-operation.  
9 Interview with Hans Nilsson (July 2003).  
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interviews – ‘make the most of the event’. At 
the meeting, a document was passed around 
to  certain  delegations,  and  it  suggested 
establishing  a  mutual  system  of  evaluation 
concerning  judicial  co-operation  and,  above 
all, the creation of the Judicial Co-operation 
Unit  (JCU).  This  was  a  window  of 
opportunity  for  the  General  Secretariat.  The 
document was discussed at length by the K4 
Committee,  but  was  rejected  by  some 
delegations. The idea did not come up again 
during the Dublin European Council of 1996, 
where  a  decision,  however,  was  made  to 
create  a  high-level  group  that  would  be  in 
charge  of  leading  an  action  programme  in 
combating  organised  crime.  During  the 
Luxembourg  Presidency,  the  group  became 
the  ‘Multidisciplinary  Group  on  Organised 
Crime’ (MGD), which served to consolidate 
police  co-operation  in  the  fight  against 
organised  crime,  and  gave  the  MGD 
definitive working autonomy.
10  
  Effectively,  it  is  in  relation  to 
specifically  judicial  actors  that  Eurojust 
emerged,  particularly  within  new  confines: 
for  example,  the  Council’s  ‘EJN’  working 
group  was  created  by  the  Irish  Presidency 
during the preparation of the Dublin European 
Council.
11  During  this  period,  new  actors 
arrived  in  Brussels  for  various  Permanent 
Representations, including Emmanuel Barbe, 
who  became  Legal  Advisor  in  1997  for 
France,  Lorenzo  Salazar  for  Italy,  Dan 
Eliasson  for  Sweden  and  Daniel  Flore  for 
Belgium (the latter two were both delegates 
                                                 
10  One  should  also  note  the  culture  shock  for  the 
Interior Ministries of ‘TREVI’ co-operation within the 
EU,  and  the  compliance  of  the  decision-making 
process with the rules and procedures of the Council, 
as Kerchove remarked: ‘the police are, by nature, more 
oriented  towards  operational  action  than  legislative 
deliberation. As the Council of Ministers is basically 
an institution that sets the standard, the police are less 
at ease there than their colleagues in the Ministries of 
Justice, who assume the primary responsibility. One of 
the challenges to overcome consists of creating certain 
procedures and devising methods that allow those in 
charge  of  the  European  police  to  co-ordinate  police 
operations at EU level, and to be involved in defining a 
European criminal policy’ (interview, July 2002).       
11  Note  from  the  Presidency  to  COREPER/Council, 
Brussels, 22 November 1996. 
from their countries for the K4 Committee). 
Flore,  also  the  Belgian  Minister  of  Justice 
(because  of  his  geographic  position)  in 
Brussels,  has  been  involved  in  European 
affairs for the longest period of time (1985).  
The entry into force of the Amsterdam 
Treaty  (May  1999)  occurred  during  the 
Finnish  Presidency,  which  was  the  first 
European Council entirely focused on issues 
of ‘Justice and Home Affairs’. In this context, 
the  Council  General  Secretariat  greatly 
benefited  from  the  support  of  the  Finnish 
Presidency.  Within  the  GSC,  the 
Kerchove/Nilsson  double  act  assembled  a 
small  team  to  test  their  ideas  about  the 
proposed  European  Judicial  Co-operation 
Unit,  which  had  already  been  mentioned  at 
the  end  of  the  1996  Irish  Presidency.  The 
name  ‘Eurojust’,  in  reference  to  Europol, 
came  up  during  these  informal  discussions. 
As  a  result,  a  network  of  professional, 
personal  and  even  friendly  relationships 
began.  Moreover,  with  some  involvement 
from universities in Belgium,
12 this network 
was  associated  with  an  editorial  strategy 
within  the  ‘European  Studies’  collection  of 
some  publications  by  the  University  of 
Brussels.  In  this  relational  system,  the  two 
parts are transformed by reciprocal interests. 
Those  of  Kerchove  and  Nilsson  were  about 
developing the role of the General Secretariat, 
drawing on national expertise and somehow 
understanding – before the negotiations – how 
an  agreement  is  most  likely  to  be  reached. 
The  Legal  Advisors,  who  held  magistrate 
posts  dealing  with  highly  technical  issues, 
were  interested  in  fostering  institutional  co-
operation.  
At this point, it was important to see 
the  project  endorsed  by  the  Finnish 
Presidency,  which  was  in  control  of  the 
initiative and the agenda. The highly specific 
role that the General Secretariat plays in the 
preparation of European Councils was pushed 
                                                 
12 For example: the Université Libre de Bruxelles, the 
Catholic  University  of  Louvain  and  the  Facultés 
universitaires Saint-Louis for Kerchove; the College of 
Europe  in  Bruges  for  Nilsson;  and  the  Catholic 
University  of  Louvain  for  Flore  –  a  former  assistant 
there.    
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to its limits. The work consisted of drafting 
the  conclusions  of  the  Presidency  in  the 
preceding months. In this process the situation 
is  still  more  specific,  since  a  European 
Council does not bring together the Ministers 
of Justice. Consequently, an informal meeting 
of  the  Ministers  of  Justice  and  the  Interior 
took  place  in  Turku,  Finland  (September 
1999), one month before the Tampere Summit 
–  a  consultation  of  ‘sectoral’  ministers 
preparing  the  European  Council.  This 
informal  meeting  concluded  with  the  first 
official political recognition of Eurojust. The 
team for the DG JHA was assisted by former 
member  of  the  German  Ministry  of  Justice 
and member of the cabinet of the GSC, Jürgen 
Trumpf.
13 The words of one member of the 
Council  General  Secretariat  further  explain 
the situation: 
 
‘For  the  debate  on  the  first  morning,  we 
prepared a series of questions about reaching 
consensus on the creation of Eurojust. We were 
quite surprised to see that not a single minister 
even mentioned the idea. Since we knew that the 
German Minister of Justice was sold on the idea 
– she had been persuaded by a German senior 
magistrate [Wolfgang Schomburg] – we went to 
speak  to  her  before  lunch  to  express  our 
astonishment. We had also drawn the attention 
of the advisor for the French Ministry of Justice, 
who was also quite keen on the idea as well. 
When  we  went  back  to  the  negotiations  – 
although  they  were  focused  on  the  issues  of 
immigration and asylum – the German Minister 
of Justice took the floor again and insisted on 
the importance of creating Eurojust. Elisabeth 
Guigou followed with her support, and after her 
intervention,  twelve  other  Ministers  of  Justice 
indicated  that  they  found  the  idea  interesting. 
This helped to convince the Finnish Presidency 
to add the principle of the creation of Eurojust 
to  the  conclusions  of  the  Tampere  European 
Council. Finland didn’t actually see the need; 
its  judicial  system  didn’t  foresee  a  particular 
role  for  the  prosecution  during  the  phase  of 
investigation and inquiry’.
14 
   
                                                 
13 The German diplomat was, however, on the way out: 
he  was  replaced  just  after  the  Tampere  Council  (18 
October  1999)  by  the  duo  of  Javier  Solana,  as 
Secretary-General/High  Representative  for  the  CFSP, 
and Pierre de Boissieu, Deputy Secretary-General.  
14 Interview (July 2002). 
This is a clear indication of the complex game 
played  by  the  agents  of  the  General 
Secretariat.  Their  position  allows  them  to 
promote  ideas,  according  to  the 
circumstances, or to advise the Presidency or 
the  national  delegations  more  easily  since 
they  do  not  have  a  single,  clearly  defined 
institutional  role  (e.g.  a  Presidency  can  do 
without  any  help  that  is  not  purely  logistic 
from the GSC). Thus, the agents of the GSC 
contribute to placing projects on the agenda. 
  This working ability is also due to the 
flexibility  of  the  administrative  organisation 
of  the  Secretariat,  which  does  not  have 
(according to some of  our interviewees) the 
same  bureaucratic  complexity  as  the 
Commission.  As  a  member  of  the  GSC 
explains, ‘we don’t need to consult multiple 
people: we form a proposal for the Presidency 
– who either takes it on or doesn’t and then 
submits it – and that’s all. It takes two days. 
In  the  Commission  it  takes  six  months, 
because it’s like a machine with a hierarchy, a 
legal service, the cabinet and the college’. A 
weakly  codified  organisation  like  the 
Secretariat  can  act  more  efficiently  in  an 
uncertain  institutional  configuration.  This 
does not mean, however, that conflicts do not 
occur.  There  was,  for  example,  the  internal 
divergence with regard to Eurojust in the GSC 
between the DG JHA and the Legal Service – 
namely with Julian Schutte as director, who 
directly dealt with Nilsson in the Council of 
Europe (Strasbourg) when he represented the 
Netherlands.  
  Another example is the imposition that 
placed  Eurojust  on  the  agenda.  This 
imposition is not always applied to all topics: 
for example, another proposal from the GSC 
– the creation of a grande école for European 
magistracy – was not adopted since there was 
neither  a  minimum  consensus  in  the 
Presidency, nor in a majority of the Member 
States.  There  was  also  the  Franco-German 
support (which the GSC sought beforehand) 
that helped Eurojust appear in the conclusions 
of the Tampere Summit. In this first game, the 
General  Secretariat  seemed  to  have  been  at 
the centre of the intellectual and institutional 
configuration.  It  was  in  these  interactions  
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between different Presidencies that the formal 
proposal to create Eurojust appeared.  
 
 
The phase of the four Presidencies  
 
The  second  game  is  that  of  the  EU 
Presidency,  where  the  formal  proposal  for 
Eurojust  was  co-ordinated.  More  precisely, 
this  included  four  Presidencies  –  Portugal, 
France,  Sweden  and  Belgium  –  and  even  a 
fifth, if the rival initiative from Germany is 
considered.  In  this  game,  the  General 
Secretariat could no longer play the main role 
in  the  process.  Instead,  the  role  of  the 
Presidencies  was  the  determining  factor; 
insofar as each one sought to advance its own 
priorities in order to see its projects succeed.  
  The Portuguese Presidency wanted to 
put  a  proposal  on  the  agenda  that  would 
immediately  achieve  a  degree  of  consensus. 
The Portuguese called for a meeting at their 
Permanent  Representation  and  invited  the 
three  subsequent  Presidencies  –  France, 
Sweden  and  Belgium.  While  hoping  to  rely 
on its other partners in order to assure a warm 
reception  for  its  project,  the  Portuguese 
Presidency was also bound by the objective of 
Tampere.  The  guidelines  imposed  by  the 
Heads of State and Government in Tampere 
(or more precisely, by the General Secretariat) 
were  extremely  precise  on  a  formal  level, 
since they indicated that the Council should 
adopt  the  necessary  legal  instrument  before 
the  end  of  2001,  i.e.  during  the  Belgian 
Presidency. The informal contacts developed 
before Tampere on the initiative of the GSC 
were  formalised  by  these  guidelines,  which 
bound  the  Presidencies  to  prioritise  them 
during the given time and in successive order 
(Portugal, France, Sweden and then Belgium). 
From this perspective,  Kerchove’s statement 
is relevant: ‘three or four delegations from the 
Member States got together in order to draft 
the plan that their respective countries would 
put  forward,  i.e.  France,  Sweden,  Portugal 
and  Belgium’.  The  influence  of  the  GSC, 
therefore,  is  applied  through  the  effects  of 
anticipating  the  European  calendars  in  the 
management  and  planning  of  the  agendas, 
while  taking  into  consideration  the 
increasingly  longer  period  of  time  that 
Brussels takes to make decisions.      
  The  institutional  space,  however,  is 
definitely in the domain of the Presidency, or 
in  this  particular  case,  of  the  four 
Presidencies. The move made in Turku could 
only  be  played  once.  It  fell  upon  the 
Portuguese Presidency to lead and co-ordinate 
the  preparatory  works  through  a  joint 
initiative. It was a member of the Ministry of 
Justice  in  Lisbon  (not  of  the  Permanent 
Representation  in  Brussels),  Theresa  Alves 
Martins,  director  of  international  relations, 
who became the co-ordinator. The Presidency 
chose an open formula of initiating discussion 
on a series of options. On 4 February 2000, it 
submitted  some  scenarios  to  the  Article  36 
Committee,
15 specifically concerning how to 
determine the extent of Eurojust’s jurisdiction 
ratione  materiae,  and  how  to  define  its 
powers.  On  this  basis,  a  questionnaire  was 
given  to  the  Ministers  of  Justice  during  an 
informal meeting in Lisbon (from 3-4 March 
2000).  
  It was not until the French Presidency, 
starting  in  July,  that  a  finished  text  was 
submitted  to  the  Council  (20  July  2000).
16 
Published  in  the  Official  Journal  on  24 
August,  it  was  signed  by  the  four 
Presidencies.
17 This initiative provided for the 
institution of a Judicial Co-ordination Unit – 
‘Eurojust’ – to be composed of one national 
representative  from  each  Member  State, 
having the status of prosecutor, magistrate or 
law enforcement officer, and for all types of 
crimes affecting two or more Member States 
that would necessitate co-ordinated action by 
judicial  authorities.  Its  jurisdiction  ratione 
materiae  is  precise:  types  of  crimes  and 
                                                 
15 This is the body in charge of co-ordinating judicial 
and police co-operation (formerly the K4). 
16  Council  documents  10356/00  EUROJUST  7  & 
10357/00  EUROJUST  8. It should  be  noted  that  the 
General  Secretariat  of  the  Council  was  the  original 
author of this text.  
17  Initiative  from  Portugal,  France,  Sweden  and 
Belgium  in  preparing  to  adopt  the  Council  decision 
establishing Eurojust so as to be able to better combat 
serious types of organised crime (OJ, C243, 24 August 
2000).      
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offences covered by the Europol Convention; 
trafficking  in  human  beings;  terrorist  acts; 
protecting  the  euro;  protecting  the  financial 
interests  of  the  Community;  money 
laundering;  and  computer  crime  and  other 
forms of crimes relating to the listed offences. 
Furthermore,  it  makes  the  provisions  that 
Eurojust  can  request  (in  a  non-binding 
manner)  that  a  Member  State  undertake  an 
investigation or proceedings in a precise case, 
or  that  several  Member  States  co-ordinate 
their investigative and procedural activities. If 
a  Member  State  refuses  to  carry  out  an 
investigation,  it  must  justify  its  decision. 
Finally, the text states that Eurojust shall have 
a legal personality, and shall be headed by a 
president and two vice-presidents – all chosen 
by  the  Council  from  the  Member  States. 
However, the text from the four Presidencies 
prepared  during  these  months  was  preceded 
by a German proposal, which was submitted a 
month beforehand and without consulting the 
four Presidencies. On the 19
th of June, with 
short  notice,  Germany  formalised  its  own 
proposal  on  Eurojust  (published  19  July),
18 
being  logically  in  the  conditions  of  power 
claiming a certain right of initiative, even of 
authorship.
19 On the initiative of the German 
co-ordinator on the Article 36 Committee, the 
text  stated  that  each  Member  State  shall 
designate  one  or  more  magistrates, 
prosecutors or law enforcement officers who 
will form Eurojust, and who shall be called 
‘liaison officials’. Thus, Eurojust is a sort of 
grouping  of  liaison  magistrates  for  a  single 
purpose, which is to make enquiries about the 
state  of  procedures  and  to  contribute  to  the 
co-ordination  of  investigations.  It  does  so, 
however, without its own structure, since the 
GSC is responsible for providing the material 
and  human  resources  for  Eurojust  (e.g. 
interpreters, translators, and additional staff). 
                                                 
18  Initiative  from  Germany  in  preparing  to  adopt 
Council decision relating to the creation of a ‘Eurojust’ 
unit (OJ, C206, 19 July 2000).    
19 Because of the former role played by Schomburg in 
‘launching’  the  idea  in  1991  with  Nilsson  and, 
particularly, with his Minister in Turku in September 
1999. 
 
Although  the  connection  to  the  discussions 
with Schomburg is clear (who is an advocate 
of  a  single  centre  for  documentation),  the 
initiative  aimed,  in  particular,  to  provide  its 
own definition of an initial text, and to define 
a  framework  with  the  least  amount  of 
discussion.  The  reactions  from  the  General 
Secretariat  and  the  four  Presidencies  were 
animated:  a  meeting  was  held  at  the 
Permanent Representation for France in order 
to  convince  the  German  Representative  to 
withdraw the proposal. In the end, however, 
two divergent initiatives were left on the table 
for  the  Council.  The  plan  of  the  four 
Presidencies  was  an  initial  compromise 
between  the  four,  before  having  to  have  it 
accepted  by  the  fifteen  Member  States.    In 
fact,  in  the  pre-negotiations,  the  Belgian 
representatives made it clear that they wanted 
a more ambitious programme, especially so as 
to  avoid  the  dual  model  of  Europol. 
According to Flore: 
 
‘Clearly,  the  Belgian  option  at  that  time  was 
that  it  should  be  a  matter  of  European 
magistrates; that we shouldn’t make the same 
mistake  as  was  made  with  Europol.  We  had 
liaison  officials  close  to  Europol  which  are 
basically the real source of information, and the 
Europol directorate had a duality; a permanent 
tension between the European and the national 
levels within Europol. The idea, then, was that 
the  magistrates  should  not  be  national,  but 
European. Along with that, France and Sweden 
wanted connections to the States. The argument 
in the negotiations was that, since the Germans 
were talking about liaison magistrates, we can’t 
oppose  it.  The  concept  of  Eurojust  national 
member came up, which is  both a member of 
Eurojust  and  a  national  member.  In  the 
decision-making process, we saw that in some 
aspects, it’s truly a European magistrate, but in 
other  essential  aspects,  it’s  a  national 
magistrate who can consult his State. From the 
discussion  among  the  four  Presidencies,  there 
was this question, which was settled by a type of 
hybridisation: national member’.
20 
 
                                                 
20  Interview  (May  2003).  See  also  his  article:  Flore 
2002.  His  exact  example  (p.  16)  states  that  liaison 
officials  are  ‘foreign  bodies’  in  the  European  unit; 
while the Europol directorate, i.e. the director, deputy 
directors  and  staff,  are  guarantors  of  European 
interests.    
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This  explains  how  Europol  –  after  having 
been a key factor in the creation of Eurojust – 
played  the  role  of  institutional  ‘counter-
model’. Behind this argument, there was also 
a  will  to  demonstrate  the  highest  level  of 
efficiency  between  judicial  and  police  co-
operation.  The  ‘real’  negotiations  began  as 
such at the beginning of October 2000 on the 
basis  of  two  philosophically  different  texts. 
Having participated in the discussions and the 
proposal  as  Justice  Advisor  to  the  Staff 
representatives  (Permanent  Representation), 
Emmanuel  Barbe  assumed  (in  accordance 
with the rules of the Presidency) the leading 
role  of  the  ‘Judicial  and  Criminal  Co-
operation’ group. Two principal dynamics are 
at play here. First of all, the issue is naturally 
the basis of negotiations found within the first 
pillar  in  the  Commission,  which  in  this 
framework  has,  as  Pierson  shows  (Pierson 
1996),  the  possibility  of  choosing  the 
opportune  time  to  submit  a  text.  Barbe’s 
strategy  was  to  progressively  narrow  the 
choices down to a single text – the one from 
the four Presidencies.
21 The second dynamic 
concerned the  group’s structure, in short, to 
create  a  specific  body  to  negotiate  for 
Eurojust.  In  this  case,  there  was  a  will  to 
create  a  high-level  group  with  ‘less  junior’ 
negotiators who had ‘more vision and skills 
that  were  more  organisational  than  strictly 
legal’.  ‘We  created  a  body,  an  institution,’ 
Barbe remarks. The manager of the Criminal 
Co-operation  group,  a  Danish  A4  (AD12) 
technical expert on Community law, was then 
replaced by Nilsson, head of division (AD14). 
It  seems  that  this  file  is  thus  considered 
somehow  as  the  most  ‘noble’  aspect  in 
judicial  co-operation  –  for  the  occasion, 
dinners were even organised. This adheres to 
the logic of the sectoral nature of Eurojust.  
The  DG  JHA  of  the  Commission  is 
usually  absent  from  this  game.  Developed 
more  recently,  made  up  of  a  strictly 
administrative  composition  and  only  having 
                                                 
21 During its meeting (5 September 2000), the Article 
36  Committee  had  asked  for  the  working  group  to 
proceed  from  an  analysis  of  the  two  texts  and  to 
combine them into one. 
some judicial expertise available to it, the DG 
JHA has not made a formal proposal before 
September  2001.  The  DG  JHA  is  primarily 
involved  in  ‘communitised’  areas,  e.g. 
asylum,  immigration  and  civil  co-operation. 
Nevertheless,  in  Tampere  it  received  the 
legitimacy to intervene in criminal matters. It 
is  therefore  revealing  that  the  Commission 
Representative  within  the  working  group  in 
charge of Eurojust negotiations is not one of 
its  officials,  but  a  seconded  national  expert 
(SNE).
22  
 
 
The independent game of the 
Commission 
 
If  the  Commission  is  truly  absent  from  the 
two  games  described  above,  it  is  certainly 
because  it  is  not  set  up  to  be  an  actor  in 
criminal  and  judicial  co-operation,  but  also 
because it is involved in another game: one 
that is focused on protecting the Community’s 
financial interests and combating fraud. It is 
in this context that the Commission proposed, 
on 29 September 2000, establishing a post of 
a  European  prosecutor  who  could  act  as  a 
valuable  instrument  and  as  a  supporter  of 
Eurojust.  This  proposal  was  made  by  the 
Commissioner  in  charge  of  the  budget 
portfolio,  financial  control  and  anti-fraud 
activity, Michaele Schreyer– not, in fact, by 
António  Vitorino,  Commissioner  for  JHA.
23 
This  initiative  is  to  be  interpreted 
autonomously  within  the  rather  complex 
relational system between the Commissioner 
for the budget, OLAF (European Anti-Fraud 
Office), which succeeded the Unit for the Co-
ordination of Fraud Prevention (UCLAF, then 
part  of  the  General  Secretariat  of  the 
Commission)  in  1999,
24  and  the  European 
                                                 
22 Martin Wasmeier, German prosecutor (having since 
integrated the services from the Commission). 
23 These two portfolios were both previously handled 
by a single person: Commissioner Anita Gradin from 
Sweden, who had very little authority.   
24 Initially established as ‘UNCLAF’, OLAF received 
independent status on 1 June 1999 in order to conduct 
internal  (i.e.  all  EU  bodies  and  institutions)  and  
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Parliament  and  its  Budgetary  Control 
Commission (COCOBU). There is an obvious 
German  influence  in  this  game:  OLAF  is 
headed  by  former  German  prosecutor  Franz 
Hermann  Brüner;  the  Budget  Commissioner 
is  Michaele  Schreyer,  who  is  an  expert  in 
budgetary  policy,  a  member  of  Germany’s 
Green Party and has a former member of the 
Ministry  of  Justice  in  Berlin,  Margarete 
Hofmann,  as  her  main  advisor;  and 
COCOBU’s president is Diemut Theato from 
the Christian Democrats (CDU).  
  The  Commission  adheres  to  a  very 
different  logic  from  the  one  that  governs 
police  and  judicial  co-operation  (although 
OLAF’s  director  was  originally  a  criminal 
judge),  and  is  under  the  influence  of  the 
European Parliament, which votes on OLAF’s 
budget and originally came up with the idea 
of having a Prosecutor in 1996. The specific 
project was outlined for the first time in 1996 
by  Klaus  Hansch,  then  president  of  the 
Parliament.  OLAF,  and  particularly  its 
director  of  ‘political,  legislation  and  legal 
affairs’  Claude  Lecou  (founding  member  of 
UCLAF), who was also very interested in the 
idea  of  a  Prosecutor  to  deal  with  non-
administrative  issues  in  his  investigations  – 
the  likes  of  which  COCOBU  carefully 
follows.  There was also a juridicisation of the 
OLAF,  symbolised  by  the  establishment  of 
the ‘Magistrates, Judicial Advice and Follow-
up’  unit,  which  is  composed  specifically  of 
magistrates  and  directly  attached  to  the 
Director-General,  and  which  has  become 
increasingly influential. The main obstacle for 
OLAF is the fact that it does not have a legal 
personality. 
  The logic of this game has roots that 
can be traced back to the Eurocrim treaty, to 
the  ‘protection  of  financial  interests’ 
convention in July 1995 and, in particular, to 
the  first  studies  during  the  1990s  that 
concluded with the Corpus Juris (1997) and 
the  Corpus  Juris  2  (2000).  However,  the 
Commission’s  recommendation  for  a 
Prosecutor happened during a specific event: 
                                                                            
external  (i.e.  all  recipients  or  debtors  of  Community 
funds) anti-fraud investigations. 
the  Intergovernmental  Conference  in  charge 
of amending the treaties.   
 
 
The IGC: combining games & 
hardening cleavages 
 
Since the Commission’s proposal was formed 
during  the  IGC,  it  had  the  effect  of 
considerably  increasing  opposition  between 
the two projects. In this competition, Eurojust 
seemed  to  be  the  only  serious  initiative  for 
judicial  co-operation.  The  Commission’s 
Prosecutor  project  offered  the  French 
Presidency  (in  charge  of  negotiations  until 
Nice) the opportunity to propose Eurojust as a 
structural  solution  to  the  Commission’s 
proposal within the IGC’s framework, and to 
see it written into the new treaty. This specific 
game  did  not  include  certain  high-level 
national actors (e.g. advisors of the Ministries 
of  Justice,  teams  of  the  Heads  of  State  and 
Government),  and  for  the  first  time,  the 
General  Secretariat  of  the  Council  was 
entirely absent.     
  Here  one  actor  seemed  to  play  a 
decisive  role:  Michel  Debacq,  advisor  for 
international affairs to the French Ministers of 
Justice  (Elisabeth  Guigou,  then  Marylise 
Lebranchu).  Debacq  had  been  appointed  to 
the post of French liaison magistrate in Rome 
in  March  1993,
25  where  he  had  contacts  in 
socialist  circles  at  his  disposal.
26  His 
contribution  was  thus  essential  when  the 
Guigou  and  then  the  Lebranchu  cabinet 
(following  the  reorganisation  of  the  Jospin 
government in mid-presidency) – relying on 
the  Ministry’s  Department  of  European  and 
International  Affairs (SAEI) then headed by 
Oliver  de  Baynast  –  took  the  important 
initiative of writing the provisions of Articles 
30 and 31, which legally enshrine Eurojust in 
the  Treaty.  The  argument  of  the  French 
Presidency mentions this in the Treaty so as 
to  better  balance  judicial  and  police  co-
                                                 
25 He wrote a paper on the expérience (Debacq 1995).  
26  Appointed  in  May  2001  to  the  head  of  the  anti-
terrorist section of the Paris prosecutor’s office, he was 
fired on 1 March 2004 following the AZF affair.  
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operation. This balance was ‘topographically’ 
assured in the Treaty with the insertion of a 
new point 2 (Eurojust): Article 31 on judicial 
co-operation, which corresponded to point 2 
in  Article  30  (Europol)  on  police  co-
operation.   
  While this issue did not figure into the 
IGC’s  mandate,  this  initiative  should  be 
understood  as  an  attempt  to  answer  the 
Commission in order to reject the Prosecutor 
project. It is in terms of ‘anti-Prosecutor’ that 
the  French  position  was  then  compromised. 
The  General  Secretariat  of  the  Council  was 
left out of this initiative: ‘We just heard after 
France’s proposal during the IGC and that it 
had been successful’, Nilsson remarked, who 
otherwise judged the initiative to be excellent. 
Kerchove,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
disappointed  that  his  draft  had  not  been 
included.  He  thought  that  the  proposed  text 
referred to some concepts that were outdated, 
like  extradition,  and  that  it  ‘still  bore  the 
marks  of  the  former  approach  of  a  judicial 
Europe’. This indicates the specific nature of 
the IGC’s game that – due to the increasingly 
high level of decision-making – momentarily 
left out certain actors in Brussels.   
  The  French  initiative  provoked  a 
degree of uncertainty in the Commission, as 
the explicit reference to the protection of the 
Community’s financial interests (PFI) caught 
its attention. As a member of OLAF’s policy 
directorate  (the  division  of  the  office  under 
the  Commission)  recalls,  ‘it  seemed 
dangerous to mention it in this particular way 
– in the chapter on Eurojust at that time. At 
the  very  least,  it  seemed  to  introduce  some 
confusion, blurring plans and ideas. At worst, 
it seemed like calling into question an acquis 
communautaire.  So,  at  that  moment,  the 
Commission  was  mobilised’.  The 
mobilisation of the Commission consisted of 
an  approach  from  Schreyer,  alongside  her 
colleagues  who  followed  the  IGC,  and  an 
intervention  from  Mireille  Delmas-Marty 
(President  of  OLAF’s  Monitoring 
Committee), who wrote about this subject to 
the  Prime  Minister  and  the  President  of 
France  in  order  to  inform  them  of  her 
committee’s concern. This was not mentioned 
in  the  actual  Treaty,  only  in  the  Eurojust 
recommendation.    
  This opposition between, in one camp, 
the French Presidency and the Member States, 
and, in the other, OLAF and the Commission, 
considerably  hardened.  Some  rumours 
circulated  about  OLAF  being  a  potential 
recruitment breeding  ground for a European 
Prosecutor,  and  even  a  few  that  were  about 
OLAF having the ambition to transform itself 
into the role. For its part, the Office defended 
itself, affirming that it ‘perceived itself as a 
department  for  investigations  –  possibly 
evolving  into  a  department  for  judicial 
investigations, or being under the control of a 
judicial Community body – but not as directly 
assuming  the  role  of  Prosecutor  or  of  a 
prosecution department’.
27 The latter adheres 
to  a  different  philosophy  towards  the  two 
projects:  
 
‘The  Commission  proposed  very  ‘integrated’ 
powers;  an  ambitious  idea  in  terms  of 
Community integration. But we started from a 
limited field of functional competence. Instead, 
as far as constructing Eurojust was concerned, 
it  was  the  opposite:  a  very  large  field  of 
competence,  but  with  a  slow  rise  in  power  in 
terms of competences at European level. These 
are,  in  fact,  two  approaches  that  cross  each 
other: one horizontal, the other vertical’.
28 
 
This cleavage was particularly exacerbated by 
the  press.  An  article  from  Les  Echos  at  the 
end  of  February  2001  was  in  favour  of  a 
European  Prosecutor  (as  included  within  a 
Prosecution service), and was presented as a 
model project against Eurojust, to which the 
following flaws were attributed:  
 
‘As  the  Dumas-Elf-Sirven  and  Angolagate 
affairs  caused  scandals  with  their  possible 
connections  to  Germany  or  because  of  their 
Swiss bank accounts, it is certain that Europe 
has not made up its mind to unify its judicial 
arena. It prefers to conjure  up solutions as it 
goes along! In December in Nice, we expected a 
European  prosecution  –  and  it  was  Eurojust 
that  was  pulled  from  the  collective  hat  of  the 
Heads of State and Government of the EU-15. 
                                                 
27  Interview  with  Sébastien  Combeaud,  member  of 
OLAF’s policy directorate (July 2003).  
28 Interview (July 2003).  
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France convinced its partners to place Eurojust 
into effect from the 1
st of March. However, in 
the eyes of a majority of MEPs and Commission 
officials  –  who  placed  their  bets  during  the 
Intergovernmental  Conference  (IGC)  with  a 
plan for a European prosecution, in line with a 
debate on harmonising European criminal law 
(i.e.  Corpus  Juris)  –  Eurojust  is  an  illusion… 
For it was necessary to amend the treaties in 
order to create a European prosecution; it was 
not because of a need for Eurojust – which is 
simply an inner circle of magistrates from the 
Ministries of Justice of the EU-15. And yet, it 
was enshrined in the Nice Treaty, as if it were 
tucked into a bed tailor-made for a European 
prosecutor…’
29 
 
This article plainly attests to the capacity of 
the  Commission  (and  its  cabinets  of 
commissioners) to mobilise journalists, and it 
provides a clear example of the hardening of 
the opposition on both sides of the cleavage 
created by the IGC. Yet, it is essential not to 
think  of  the  Commission  as  a  homogenous 
group, as it is laced with internal tensions. In 
this  instance,  here  the  cleavages  are  found 
between, on one side, the cabinet of Schreyer, 
the DG Budget and OLAF; and, on the other 
side,  the  DG  JHA,  led  by  Commissioner 
Vitorino. Those in the second camp are much 
more open to the idea of Eurojust, and even 
sometimes critical of the Prosecutor project. 
As such, the Commission notice on Eurojust 
(22 November 2000) drafted by the DG JHA 
is  rather  measured.
30  As  part  of  the 
introduction states: ‘While not ruling out the 
possibility  of  presenting  a  proposal  on  that 
subject,  the  Commission  has  preferred  to 
adopt  a  position  in  the  form  of  a 
communication’.
31  This  is  an  unusual 
approach,  as  its  author  Martin  Wasmeier 
(Representative  of  the  Commission  in  the 
working  group)  acknowledges.  The 
                                                 
29  Royo  M.,  « L’Europe  judiciaire  à  reculons »,  Les 
Echos, 21 février 2001. 
30  Commission  Notice  on  the  creation  of  Eurojust 
[COM(2000)746 final – not published in the OJ], 22 
November 2000. 
31  Interview  (July  2003).  See  also,  ‘Communication 
from  the  Commission  on  the  establishment  of 
Eurojust’,  Europa.eu,  07.09.2005, 
<http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l33144.htm> 
[accessed 18 Nov. 08] (§ 3 of 15). 
Commission  proposes,  of  course,  a  certain 
sharing  of  tasks  with  OLAF,  but  it 
simultaneously affirms the urgent need for an 
ambitious project: ‘The Commission believes 
that Eurojust should mark a further qualitative 
step  in  closer  judicial  cooperation  and  go 
beyond the work carried out by the European 
Judicial  Network’.  Its  recommendations 
concerning  the  character  of  Eurojust  are 
similar:  ‘The  unit  should  be  given  legal 
personality  and  its  own  budget  in  order  to 
guarantee  a  certain  degree  of  independence 
and  autonomy’.  Finally,  the  communication 
requests the presence of a delegate. Only this 
last request – a classic institutional demand – 
was  not  accepted;  above  all  due  to  the 
consensus  of  the  Member  States  aiming  to 
exclude the Commission from all operational 
judicial undertakings. The DG JHA’s position 
was  primarily  to  make  sure  that  Eurojust 
appeared  in  the  Community’s  plans  for 
everything  that  concerns  the  institutional 
character, and not attain a special status vis-à-
vis  the  other  agencies  (e.g.  Europol)  as  a 
result. 
  In addition, these same cleavages exist 
in  the  European  Parliament  and  its  two 
competent  committees:  COCOBU  and  the 
Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, 
Justice  and  Home  Affairs.  The  former 
committee  supports  the  Prosecutor  position, 
and is reserved towards Eurojust. The stance 
of the second committee is the opposite, and 
is the one taken by the Parliament. Led by the 
rapporteur of the project Evelyne Gebhardt, a 
group  of  MEPs  was  in  charge  of  writing  a 
report  on  the  proposal  of  the  Council 
concerning the establishment of Eurojust. Its 
favourable  reception  by  this  Parliamentary 
Committee  is  therefore  not  surprising.  The 
Committee’s  report  states  (27  April  2001): 
‘The development of judicial co-operation in 
criminal  matters  to  mirror  Europol’s 
competences is a requirement of the rule of 
law.  Eurojust  should  be  designed  in  such  a 
way as to become the initial stage of a future 
European  public  prosecutor’s  office’.  The 
only  recommendation  from  the  Parliament 
was  about  the  role  of  police  officers  as 
national members of Eurojust. The Parliament  
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wanted to reserve this possibility for only the 
States in which the tasks of the prosecutors 
are handled by the police.  
  The  Parliament  played  the  most 
important  role  with  the  support  of  another 
Committee  in  the  Prosecutor  project,  which 
served  as  a counter proposal for the  French 
Presidency  during  the  IGC.  The  paradox  of 
Eurojust (at that point, not yet in existence or 
established  in  the  Treaty)  can  only  be 
understood  through  the  specificity  of  the 
IGC’s game. The isolated move made by the 
French  Presidency  within  the  French 
governmental  space  –  which  caused  some 
structural effects in the Commission’s game – 
would  not  have  been  possible  in  another 
configuration. 
 
 
The conclusion of negotiations: the 
reversed game of the Council 
 
The  final  game  was  played  by  the  Council 
and  its  components:  the  working  group,  the 
Article  36  Committee  (CATS)  and  the 
Council  of  Ministers  of  JHA.  Partially 
resulting  from  the  four  preceding  ones,  this 
game concerns a decision made in an agenda 
heavily  influenced  by  September  11
th  (the 
decision is in fact dated 6 December 2001). 
Here  the  structure  of  decision-making  is 
reversed,  since  these  are  officials  within  a 
group  who  are  supposed  to  conclude 
negotiations;  whereas,  in  general,  they  also 
initiate  them.  This  game  manifests  itself  in 
two  forms:  firstly,  in  an  initial  stage  of 
negotiations in the provisionally named ‘Pro-
Eurojust’  Unit  (concluded  in  December 
2000); and secondly, the stage of negotiations 
on  the  final  decision  that  was  made  on  6 
December  2001.  Another  specific  feature  of 
the  Eurojust  negotiations  rests  with  the  fact 
that a part of the initial debates were in reality 
on  the  establishment  of  an  experimental, 
provisional Unit that foreshadowed the final 
institution. Once again, the origin of the idea 
goes  back  to  the  General  Secretariat  of  the 
Council. Here is the story we were told in the 
Secretariat:    
 
‘We thought that it would take too much time to 
create  Eurojust,  like  the  five  years  that  we 
waited  for  Europol.  It  was during  the  French 
Presidency,  and  we  were  working  on  a 
provisional  unit  while  waiting  for  the  text 
establishing Eurojust to be completely worked 
out and adopted… One afternoon, we drafted a 
short plan for the creation of the unit, and we 
sent  it  to  the  Minister  of  Justice,  Elisabeth 
Guigou’.
32 
  
   Without wishing to support either side 
in  the  endless  debate  over  the  origin  of  the 
ideas, it was once again the leadership of the 
GSC  who  intervened  through  its  role  of 
facilitator  and  political  advisor  –  this  time 
during the French Presidency. Here again, the 
GSC’s  move  was  one  of  an  exchange  of 
courtesies, rather than that of an imposition, 
which is institutionally impossible.   
  The  logic  of  institutional  imitation  – 
following the Europol model that had started, 
in 1994, an anti-drug unit before its definitive 
establishment in 1999 – worked well in this 
game.  This  also  corresponded  to  both  the 
pressure on the Presidencies who want to see 
important projects come into effect during the 
short  period  of  the  rotation  (six  months,  or 
five  if  one  excludes  August),  and  to  the 
French Presidency’s desire to take advantage 
of  the  momentum  of  Tampere.  This 
institutional  ‘recipe’  also  allowed  for  an 
intelligent  response  to  be  put  forth,  and  an 
exit strategy to Germany’s rival proposal. The 
following  quote  is  an  example  of  the 
mobilised  argument:  ‘As  your  project  is 
‘light’, it will be for the Pro-Eurojust; the real 
Eurojust  will  come  after’.  The  central  idea, 
however, was to reinforce Eurojust, rendering 
it  inevitable,  and  to  lead  the  negotiations 
towards a definitive Unit as Kerchove states: 
‘The  presence  in  Brussels  of  a  unit  of  15 
magistrates  was  useful  for  us  in  order  to 
establish  an  institution  that  meets  the  real 
needs  of  the  practitioners  of  judicial  and 
criminal assistance’.  
In  any  case,  this  project  was 
considered to be safe by the Member States, 
and the negotiations soon made progress. The 
                                                 
32 Interview (May 2003).  
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Ministers  of  Justice  gave  their  political 
endorsement  of  Pro-Eurojust  at  an  informal 
meeting held in Marseille at the end of July 
2000.  The  negotiation  unfolded  within  the 
framework  of  the  high-level  Article  36 
Committee,  which  gathered  some  senior 
officials  from  Justice  and  Interior.  The 
decision was adopted by the JHA Council on 
14 December 2000, a few days after the Nice 
Summit,  and  was  directly  applicable  to  all 
Member  States.  The  only  opposition  came 
from  the  Commission  (DG  JHA),  which 
argued  that  there  was  no  urgency,  and  that 
this transitional solution would not be able to 
last.  This  position  was  relayed  by  the 
rapporteur of the project in the Parliament. 
  The  immediate  outcome  came  on  1 
March 2001 within the General Secretariat of 
the Council, with 15 magistrates forming Pro-
Eurojust. Until the adoption of the definitive 
instrument, the Unit was led by the National 
Representative of the State that held the EU 
Presidency  (Björn  Blomqvist,  Sweden). 
France  chose  Olivier  de  Baynast  as  its 
representative, until then head of SAEI. There 
was enthusiasm in the air. Nilsson organised a 
dinner that evening at his home, and recalls: 
‘There were a lot of people and it was really 
almost  euphoric.  It  was:  ‘Now,  we  have 
created  something’’.  The  specific  nature  of 
institutional creation arises here again, as does 
a transformation of the modalities of judicial 
work. In fact, many members of Pro-Eurojust 
came to Brussels having met with difficulties 
in  carrying  out  their  duties,  and  then  being 
able to be a part of a Community body.  
  After the provisional unit was set up, 
all  that  remained  was  to  negotiate  the  final 
decision.  Two  Presidencies  were  left 
following the timetable scheduled in Tampere 
– the Swedish and the Belgian. Negotiations 
were taken up again in the Council’s working 
group (for judicial and criminal co-operation), 
joined  in  a  restricted  Eurojust  session  with 
Barbe. The increasing influence further took 
shape  when  Sweden  appointed  Peter 
Strömberg as president of the Eurojust group. 
Although  the  French  Presidency  essentially 
served  to  review  the  text  and  identify 
discussion points, during Nice there was still 
an  absence  of  consensus  –  except  for  the 
general missions, competencies and structure 
(National  Member  and  College).  The 
negotiations  began  with  the  Swedish 
Presidency  and  were  more  concerned  with 
technical  issues,  especially  data  protection 
and the structures (e.g. the audit scheme and 
the administrative director).  
The  Belgian  Presidency  concluded 
negotiations.  The  process  of  raising  the 
profile of the president of the Eurojust group 
continued. Flore, who followed up on all the 
negotiations,  now  chaired  both  the  Eurojust 
group  and  the  high-level  Article  36 
Committee  after  the  internal  change  of  the 
Belgian  Minister  of  Justice.  He  intended  to 
reassert  himself  with  regard  to  the  GSC.  In 
order to come to a decision at the end of his 
presidency, he planned  no less than thirteen 
days of meetings, which was more than had 
been  held  by  all  three  of  the  preceding 
Presidencies regarding criminal co-operation. 
He  also  used  his  position  as  president  of 
CATS  to  emphasise  the  group’s 
responsibilities: ‘I started from the idea that 
all  the  governments  were  committed  to 
Tampere, and an official in a working group 
wasn’t supposed to hinder the political will to 
successfully  finish  in  December  2001’.
33 
Nilsson,  still  the  organiser  for  the  group, 
recalls  that  he  ‘never  worked  less  than  80 
hours a week during the Belgian Presidency’. 
He  added  that  ‘that  was  the  only  time  I 
thought maybe I should put a bed in here’.
34  
In  this  configuration,  September  11
th 
made  some  disputes  over  Eurojust  seem 
rather trivial, especially since the agenda was 
quickly  overloaded  with  other  projects 
including:  European  arrest  warrants  and  the 
definition  of  terrorism  on  a  special  Council 
agenda  on  20  September;  and  the  special 
European  Council  on  21  September.  These 
last  two  projects,  as  well  as  Eurojust,  were 
adopted by the JHA Council on 6 December 
2001.  On  11  December  2001,  in  an  ironic 
twist of fate, a case of bad timing or a desire 
for  revenge,  the  Commission  published  its 
                                                 
33 Interview (May 2003). 
34 Interview (July 2003).   
GSPE Working Papers – Michel Mangenot – 1/5/2009  15 
Green  Paper  on  the  establishment  of  a 
European Prosecutor.
35 
The  official  decision  in  establishing 
Eurojust was made on 28 February 2002 and 
published  in  the  Official  Journal  (OJ)  on  6 
March,  the  date  of  its  entry  into  force.  Its 
offices  (as  Pro-Eurojust)  were  then  moved 
from the GSC in Brussels to The Hague on 10 
December  2002.  The  official  inauguration 
took place on 29 April 2003. The choice of 
The Hague – due to the presence of Europol
36 
–  was  ratified  during  the  Laken  European 
Council in December 2001, was definitively 
confirmed  by  a  decision  on  13  December 
2003.
37  On  14  April  2003,  Eurojust  finally 
signed  an  agreement  protocol  with  OLAF, 
ruling on the issue of the modalities of mutual 
co-operation;  and  then  did  the  same  with 
Europol (9 June 2004).  
The Commission’s Green Paper on a 
European Prosecutor is to be studied in light 
of the last institutional game: the Convention 
and then the new IGC where the Constitution 
was born. Indeed, it is in these last two bodies 
that a second competition took place between 
the Prosecutor project and Eurojust. This new 
negotiation  gave  the  advantage  to  Eurojust. 
The compromise made by the presidium was 
to  maintain  the  possibility  to  create  the 
Prosecutor leading a Prosecution service, but 
‘from  Eurojust’  and  with  unanimity,  which 
ruined its chances. It is this same formulation 
that was taken up again at the IGC, and was 
thus part of the Constitution; adopted on 18 
June  2004  by  the  European  Council  in 
Brussels, and signed in Rome on 29 October 
2004 (Article III-274). At the same time, the 
text consecrated the existence of Eurojust in 
its preceding article.    
 
                                                 
35  European  Commission,  Green  Paper  on  criminal-
law  protection  of  the  financial  interests  of  the 
Community  and  the  establishment  of  a  European 
Prosecutor, Brussels, 11 December 2001 (COM (2001) 
0715 final). 
36 Luxembourg was the other possible choice. 
37  Decision  of  the  Representatives  of  the  Member 
States  meeting  with  the  Heads  of  State  and  of 
Government,  13  December  2003  (OJ,  3  February 
2004). 
The  decision  to  establish  Eurojust  can 
therefore  be  explained  by  a  series  of  five 
institutional games (or six if the Convention-
Constitution game is included). These games 
involved a plurality of actors, and it is as such 
that  this  project  –  with  origins  as  old  as 
Europol  –  can  have  several  claims  of 
authorship:  German,  French  or  Belgian  – 
according to the involvement of these States 
in  one  game  or  another.  Another  claim  of 
authorship has even arisen from Italy, which 
claimed  that  this  institutional  model  was 
inspired  by  their  Directorate-General  Anti-
Mafia. If there were a claim to authorship to 
look  into,  it  would  be  that  of  the  General 
Secretariat of the Council; which is, however, 
impossible to claim, and is clearly officially 
linked to many other protagonists. The role of 
certain  national  magistrates  is  also  an 
important factor, since they were anxious to 
improve institutional co-operation.    
  Eurojust began its operations in 2002 
(2001  for  Pro-Eurojust)  in  Brussels,  then  in 
The Hague (located in the same building as 
the International Criminal Court). Within this 
framework, it would be useful to continue the 
analysis  by  observing  the  placement  of  this 
body  and  the  practices  of  this  institutional 
creation  by  the  national  magistrates  – 
practices that could lead to certain types of re-
nationalisation.  
  However, what is most striking is the 
permanent  debate  about  its  institutional 
structure.  As  such,  the  project  of  the 
constitutional text plans a new decision on the 
definitive  definition  of  Eurojust.  The 
European  Council,  on  4-5  November  2004, 
launched  the  ‘Hague  Programme’,  and 
established  that  this  decision  should  be 
adopted  on  the  recommendation  of  the 
Commission,  which  happened  in  late  2008 
during  the  French  Presidency.  A  re-
negotiation took place, which confirmed that 
institutional  innovation  is  a  European 
speciality.
38 
                                                 
38 This characteristic observed for the CFSP by Yves 
Buchet  de  Neuilly  is  far  from  being  specific  to  this 
pillar or external policy in a larger sense. See Buchet 
de Neuilly 2002.   
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